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SHEDDING THE BURDEN OF SISYPHUS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WRONGFUL 
CONVICTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Robert Schehr* 
Abstract: Efforts to address the scourge of wrongful conviction in the 
United States would benefit from a theoretical framework for applying 
international law. Mythology has long been acknowledged as perhaps the 
most effective way to propagate values within a culture and to the external 
world. A new sort of mythology—one that can seamlessly accommodate 
local cultural variations—should be mobilized to enforce transcultural 
values and norms. This conception of mythology calls for the primacy of 
justice, the abrogation of sovereignty to the extent it precludes justice, and 
cultural variation within the parameters of human rights. Although the 
United States was founded on the law of nations and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has long extended comity to international law, in recent years 
American jurisprudence—particularly in the Supreme Court—has assumed 
an isolationist approach. This regrettable development is largely responsible 
for the systemic failures in the criminal justice system that have allowed 
wrongful conviction to become the pervasive problem that it is today. 
Brotherhood and otherhood must always exist side by side.1 
Introduction 
 Sisyphus is notable in Greek mythology for being compelled to live 
out eternity unceasingly pushing a boulder the size of a Volkswagen 
Beetle up a hill, only to have the boulder  roll back down again and 
again. The figure of Sisyphus is a suitable metaphor to describe inno-
cence activists confronting the significant structural changes necessary 
to avoid and remedy wrongful convictions. The entrenched procedural 
and cultural obstacles to change in the subcultures of law enforcement 
officers, state police forensics labs, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
                                                                                                                      
* Professor, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice; Executive Director, 
Northern Arizona Justice Project, Northern Arizona University. I would like to extend my 
heartfelt appreciation to my department colleagues, Dr. Raymond Michalowski and Dr. 
Michael Costelloe, and to editors at the Boston College Third World Law Journal for their 
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
1 Jeffrey C. Alexander, The Civil Sphere 22 (2006). 
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the judiciary pose a challenge tantamount to a Sisyphian struggle. Is it 
possible that our Sisyphus, painstakingly making some progress (as with 
the Justice For All Act, and some state legislation)—often only to see it 
roll back over time—will someday be able realize affirmative change in 
wrongful convictions?2 In my view, so long as courts in the United 
States continue to rely solely on domestic case law and retributive stat-
utes designed to strip the accused of the due process protections, inno-
cence activists will continue to toil with Sisyphus along the same worn 
path, bearing the same insurmountable weight. 
 I begin with the premise that, in order for the United States to 
make the criminal procedure changes necessary to avoid wrongful con-
victions, innocence activists must adopt a counter-hegemonic narrative 
based on insights emerging in international law, in particular human 
rights law and the criminal procedures of transnational bodies. Doing 
so will require legal practitioners and the judiciary to forego U.S. ex-
ceptionalism (and its concomitant claims of threats to sovereignty) and 
demonstrate a willingness to learn from and, where appropriate, adopt 
insights culled from transnational jurisprudence and policies.3  Such a 
commitment would signify maturation of our legislative and judicial 
processes.4 However, when it comes to consideration of international 
law and human rights, contemporary U.S. courts continue to be shaped 
by both a deep-seated political, economic, and cultural commitment to 
exceptionalism and the United States’ contemporary status as the 
world’s dominant superpower. In addition to the United States’ stub-
born aversion to the adoption of key international human rights 
agreements, some of its Supreme Court justices have shown overt hos-
tility toward consideration of foreign innovations that would advance 
domestic human rights.5 
 Part I makes the case that international law should be viewed as a 
global mythology necessary to organize an increasingly interconnected 
world. Part II advocates the efficacy of international law within the con-
text of transnational civil society. Part III presents a final theoretical 
                                                                                                                      
2 See, e.g., Justice For All Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603–10603e, 14163–14163e (2004 
& 2007 Supp.). 
3 “U.S. exceptionalism” refers to the belief that the United States is, in some measure, 
beyond reproach on account of its national origins and unique political institutions. See 
David P. Forsythe, The United States and International Criminal Justice, 24 Hum. Rts. Q. 974, 
975 (2002); Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights, International 
Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 Emory L.J. 775, 777 (2001). 
4 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, International Law, Sovereignty, and American Constitutional-
ism: Reflections on the Customary International Law Debate, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 91, 92 (2004). 
5 See Forsythe, supra note 3, at 980. 
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consideration necessary to domestic adoption of international human 
rights criteria (and other transnational criminal procedure innova-
tions) by introducing the concept of cosmopolitan democracy. The 
concluding Parts argue that, by adopting the most salient features of 
international criminal law, the United States will realize the Kantian 
notion of the Federalism of Free Nations and will come to recognize 
the common transnational thread that connects all people everywhere: 
the right to liberty and justice. It is here that the subject of wrongful 
conviction comes into the scope of our discussion, albeit only in a ru-
dimentary way.6 
 To approach contemporary jurisprudential concerns in the United 
States from a transnational perspective is not unique. Indeed, for centu-
ries legal scholars have contended that U.S. jurisprudence has much to 
learn from transnational innovations.7 My approach is unique, however, 
in that it suggests that transnational comity is inevitable due to its role as 
a new global mythology, located within the sociological understanding 
of civil society and couched in terms of cosmopolitan democracy. The 
goal is to establish a theoretical framework for applying international 
law (and the innovations of a transnational body of case law and stat-
utes) to the vexatious problem of wrongful convictions in the United 
States. 
I. International Human Rights as Mythology 
 International human rights law signifies a grand mythology. In-
creasing transnational interactions regarding commerce, the environ-
ment, and the media will cause a new mythology to emerge and guide 
international relations. Myths serve the purpose of providing common 
understanding. They are deep structures that provide a common narra-
tive and speak to a prevailing desire among human beings for ways to 
                                                                                                                      
6 A more substantive application of international law and practice to the subject of 
domestic wrongful conviction is forthcoming. My purpose, in this piece, is to establish the 
theoretical context for the substantive claims to follow in future work. 
7 See, e.g., generally Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of 
Racial Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 433 (1995) 
(discussing the death penalty); Elizabeth Burleson, Juvenile Execution, Terrorist Extradition, 
and Supreme Court Discretion to Consider International Death Penalty Jurisprudence, 68 Alb. L. 
Rev. 909 (2005) (discussing the death penalty); Martha F. Davis, The Spirit of Our Times: 
State Constitutions and International Human Rights, 30 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 359 
(2006) (discussing state constitutions and international human rights); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347 (discussing transnational juris-
prudence); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 429 
(2003) (discussing an international judicial system). 
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understand themselves in broader and more diverse temporal and spa-
tial contexts. According to Joseph Campbell, myths serve the purpose 
of “explain[ing] the maturation of the individual from dependency 
through adulthood, through maturity, and then to exit.”8 Since myths 
are typically generated within a specific culture, the idea of applying 
the language of myth to a cross-cultural context is novel. But given in-
creasing transnational associations and an ever-present liquidity in re-
gard to how subjects come to experience temporal and spatial relation-
ships, it seems appropriate—and, in fact, imperative—that we apply 
insights generated from mythology to an ever more diverse set of trans-
national social relationships and geopolitical situations.9 
 I am not making the claim that the law itself is mythology. Rather, 
the role expectations, rituals, and authority that comprise the law are 
mythological in orientation. In this context, international human rights 
law  is a manifestation of deeply rooted desires among human beings to 
generate archetypal modes of proper transnational interaction. Inter-
national human rights discourse signifies the human desire to navigate 
temporal and spatial relations in a world where previous, archetypal 
modes of interaction are increasingly penetrated by a host of transna-
tional practices. In this way, international human rights law allows 
global actors to interact in a manner conducive to peaceful cohabita-
tion. Because this is a monumental task given the nature and diversity 
of existing cultures, a grand myth has emerged once again to serve the 
purpose that culturally specific mythology has always served. 
 To help clarify the distinction I am attempting to make between 
parochial mythology and the grander transnational mythology animat-
ing human rights jurisprudence, consider U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Antonin Scalia’s aversion to domestic adoption of insights generated 
through international court opinions—whether they be from the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ), an international human rights organiza-
tion, or any individual state or combination of states (for example, the 
European Union). In his dissenting opinions in Atkins v. Virginia, Law-
rence v. Texas, and Roper v. Simmons, Justice Scalia argues that domestic 
jurisprudence should be guided by constitutionalism and fidelity to the 
                                                                                                                      
8 Joseph Campbell with Bill Moyers, The Power of Myth 41 (1988). 
9 See generally Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (2000). Bauman’s explication of 
“liquidity” is used as a metaphor to describe contemporary modernity. Id. at 2. Most salient 
for our purposes is Bauman’s suggestion that traditional, more stable institutions, refer-
ence groups, patterns, and codes have given way to the “epoch of universal comparison.” 
Id. at 7. The result is a clash of patterns and configurations that challenges traditional co-
ercive powers. See generally id. 
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framers’ “original intent.”10 That is, only human rights enumerated in 
the U.S. Constitution, together with those that have arisen from U.S. 
case law, should be germane when considering how to decide domestic 
cases. Stated in the context of mythology, what Justice Scalia articulates 
is a narrow, culturally-bounded interpretation of myth. For example, 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, the case in which the Court 
declared anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional, chides the majority for its 
reference to changing international opinions regarding homosexual 
sodomy laws.11 Scalia writes: “Much less do [constitutional entitlements] 
spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because foreign na-
tions decriminalize conduct.”12 As Justice Scalia would remind the Court, 
Bowers v. Hardwick—the decision overruled by Lawrence—had “never re-
lied on ‘values we share with a wider civilization,’” but was, instead, 
based upon the supposed deeply held values and traditions of U.S. citi-
zens.13 Likewise, in Atkins v. Virginia, a case in which the Court ruled 
against the constitutionality of executing the mentally ill, Justice Scalia 
penned a dissent challenging the majority’s suggestion that interna-
tional opinion—including international human rights treaties regarding 
execution in general and execution of the mentally ill specifically—may 
be used to inform U.S. judicial opinions.14 Scalia intones: “Equally ir-
relevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’ whose notions of 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 
347–48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). As normative practice, the American interpretation 
of constitutionalism can be traced to a letterfrom the Massachusetts General Court in 
1768. Herman Belz, Constitutionalism, in The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court 
of the United States 190, 191 (Kermitt L. Hall et al. eds., 1992). In that letter, the Gen-
eral Court emphasized that, “‘In all free States the Constitution is fixed; & as the supreme 
Legislative derives its Power & Authority from the Constitution, it cannot overleap the 
Bounds of it, without destroying its own foundation.’” Id. Thus, the Constitution served “as 
the permanent, binding, and paramount political law of the polity.” Id. at 190. Beginning 
with Chief Justice John Marshall’s ruling in the landmark Marbury v. Madison case, Consti-
tutionalism came to refer to the enhancement and near-monopoly of judicial authority 
over constitutional questions and disputes. Id. at 192; see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 
Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the judiciary as the primary 
vehicle for redressing constitutional injuries dominated until the 1930s, when political 
uprisings calling for increased social justice ushered in a far greater role for the legislative 
branch of government. See Belz, supra, at 192. According to Belz, the U.S. Supreme Court 
attempted a return to its previous emphasis on Constitutionalism in the 1980s by once 
again enhancing the role of the judiciary over matters of public policy. See generally id. (ex-
plaining constitutionalism). 
11 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
12 Id. 
13 See id. (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 193–94 (1986)). 
14 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 347–48 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people.”15 Quoting his 
dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma, Justice Scalia returns to a myopic con-
stitutionalism when he argues that: 
We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United 
States of America that we are expounding. . . . [W]here 
there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, 
the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices 
of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon 
Americans through the Constitution.16 
Justice Scalia reserves his most spirited invective for his dissent in Roper 
v. Simmons, the case which effectively banned the execution of juve-
niles.17 He begins with an indictment of the majority’s subordination of 
the “original meaning of the Eighth Amendment” to “‘evolving stan-
dards of decency.’”18 Criticizing the majority for acting as the “sole arbi-
ter of our Nation’s moral standards,” Scalia continues by decrying the 
Court’s references to “the views of foreign courts and legislatures.”19 
 Justice Scalia’s remarks in Lawrence, Atkins, and Roper are certainly 
not unique among Supreme Court justices, but they do serve as con-
temporary examples of a strong emphasis on originalism and its con-
comitant aversion to the ideas, opinions, and jurisprudential influences 
of people living beyond U.S. borders. The tendency for some Supreme 
Court justices to dismiss international court opinions as “irrelevant” to 
                                                                                                                      
15 Id. I agree with Justice Scalia that international variation regarding our “notions of 
justice” is an important aspect of our cultural identity and should be respected. He errs, 
however, in his thorough dismissal of insights arising from international law and practice. 
When he exclaims, “Equally irrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community,’” Justice 
Scalia adopts a parochial, intellectually dishonest, and, in my view, ideological position. Id. 
The practices of the world community have been of interest to the political, economic, and 
legal communities in the United States since its founding, a point that I will address in 
greater detail. What Justice Scalia either fails to recognize, or cannot allow himself to rec-
ognize out of concern for ideological consistency, is that it is neither necessary nor desir-
able for U.S. judges and politicians to adopt the practices of the international community 
entirely and indiscriminately. Rather, what benefits all nations is a recognition of interna-
tional norms of justice and human rights that simultaneously preserves cultural unique-
ness. This idea will be more fully explored in the body of the text as part of my discussion 
of cosmopolitanism. 
16 Id. at 348 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868–69, n.4 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). 
17 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
18 Id. at 608 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 561). 
19 Id. He concludes his opening salvo by writing: “Because I do not believe that the 
meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of 
our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this 
Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent.” Id. 
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deliberations over domestic disputes can be viewed as a manifestation 
of a time-honored dualism intended to marginalize outsiders. As far 
back as 1948–49, when the United Nations first adopted its Declaration 
of Human Rights, country-specific narratives seeking to define “democ-
racy” differently than the master narratives generated by Western de-
mocratic states (Great Britain, France, and the United States) were dis-
counted, marginalized, and delegitimated.20 Desperate to understand 
how to implement the newly created Declaration of Human Rights, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) Committee of Experts, in May 1949, distributed an interna-
tional survey to philosophers and social scientists soliciting their under-
standing of “democracy” and its relation to  international human rights 
discourse. What the Committee soon came to realize was that the ma-
nipulation of “value-loaded words with unstable cognitive connotations 
is a powerful tool of attitude influencing and control.”21 The Committee 
found that the concept of “democracy” was prone to manipulation by 
powerful nations often having it as their “deceitful motive” to advance a 
certain political agenda.22 
 In a related way, Daniel Levin contends that originalist positions 
offer 
the possibility of an immediate and authentic encounter with 
the past tied to a critique of modernism as both antidemo-
cratic and inauthentic. Originalism portrays the federal pe-
riod as a special moment of civic unity, whose virtues have 
been preserved by the larger public, but have been eroded 
among elites by modernity.23 
So it is that Justice Scalia attempts—through binary juxtaposition of 
his own originalist interpretation of the Constitution with others’ “in-
ferior” contemporary transnational claims to human rights—to mar-
ginalize and delegitimate doctrinal developments from abroad. 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
21 Arne Naess & Stein Rokkan, Analytical Survey of Agreements and Disagreements, in De-
mocracy in a World of Tensions 463 (Richard McKeon & Stein Rokkan eds., 1951), 
available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001335/133513eo.pdf. 
22 Id. at 464. According to Henri Lefebvre, a French respondent to the survey, “middle-
class politicians mislead the people by trying to let their bourgeois democracy pass for the 
ideal democracy—be it from unconscious prejudice or from a deliberate, cynical determi-
nation to bamboozle.” Id. at 464–65. 
23 Daniel Levin, Federalists in the Attic: Original Intent, the Heritage Movement, and Democ-
ratic Theory, 29 Law & Soc. Inquiry 105, 105 (2004). 
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 Certainly one could contend that, because the colonies (and later 
the federation of states) constituted a relatively homogenous grouping, 
a more insular and exceptionalist conception of myth may have seized 
the imagination of the framers. But, neither the framers nor the early 
Supreme Court held such a myopic view of the principles that in-
formed the drafting and initial interpretation of the Constitution. Both 
the framers and the early Supreme Court made frequent references to 
international law and human rights, and thus in no way did either in-
tend for the Constitution to be strictly interpreted as an intractable and 
essentialistic charter incapable of responding to changing times and 
circumstances. Neither did they ignore the “evolving standards of de-
cency” articulated in numerous foreign court opinions throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.24 Indeed, such standards were 
cited by the Supreme Court when it was found useful to do so.25 
 Transnational social relationships and the procurement of peace-
ful cohabitation of diverse peoples require a new mythology that tran-
scends localized or national culture. While this new mythology will 
still be infused with cultural variations in the character and flavor of 
its stories, it also—as a matter of necessity, reason, and sound policy— 
will slowly incorporate narratives that speak to transnational matters 
of significance. The reason for situating a discussion of international 
human rights law and its applicability to domestic wrongful conviction 
within this context is to generate understanding of the significance of 
international human rights discourse for the continued evolution of 
criminal law and criminal procedure in the United States. By recourse 
to mythology, I can more effectively contend that positions taken in 
opposition to adherence to international law by U.S. courts—at least 
when made on grounds of constitutionalism and “original intent” —
are seriously flawed. No longer can any country blamelessly exempt 
itself from participation in the grander human rights discourse that 
began to emerge in the middle of the twentieth century.26 Domestic 
attempts to do so promote a parochialism that will position Americans 
at the opposite pole of a growing transnational mythology that pro-
motes universal peace and well-being. 
 When I teach students about federalism, I make a point to empha-
size that any physical lines of demarcation existing between the states 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (stating that courts should interpret the 
Eighth Amendment in accordance with “evolving standards of decency that mark the pro-
gress of a maturing society”). 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 134–167. 
26 A movement that, notably, was initiated in part by the United States. 
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are artificial. To make this point, I explain to them how I felt the first 
time I flew in an airplane and noticed that, when I peered through my 
window to the earth thousands of miles below me, the cartographical 
lines with which I was so familiar were not really there. Of course, my 
students laugh at how simplistic the example is. But, insofar as it per-
tains to how humans come to know their place in the world, the point 
is far more complex. This same analogy can be drawn when consider-
ing transnational geopolitical distinctions. Beautiful, almost spiritual, 
satellite images of Earth depict stunningly clear oceans, clouds, and 
terra firma constituted by flatlands and mountains. There are no lines 
to demarcate nation-state boundaries. Those boundaries, thought to be 
so important to our sense of national pride, are but artificial products 
of conquest and political negotiation. In contrast to the striated space 
constituting geographic boundaries, there is only smooth and continu-
ous space.27 Recognizing this physically unfettered multidimensionality 
radically alters one’s sense of the neatly demarcated, but seriously 
flawed, parochialism that pervades contemporary domestic jurispru-
dence. 
 Nothing makes this point more salient than the ubiquitous power 
of the Internet and satellite telecommunications. With media of this 
sort, information scatters in endless multi-directional bursts without 
obstruction, not needing to stop at border checkpoints. A person no 
longer need be living in the Middle East to receive news, reported in 
Arabic, from places like Iraq, Iran, or Pakistan—one need only tune in 
to Al Jazeera. Fans of European, Asian, or Latin American football need 
not be located in any of these places to watch the games, but rather can 
view them on television, often live and beamed from satellites hovering 
far above the Earth. Furthermore, consider decisions made by govern-
ments or corporations that, despite initially appearing to have only 
domestic impact, produce effects that reach far beyond national bor-
ders.28 Take, for example, how decisions made by corporations to emit 
air and water pollution can affect the quality of the air and drinking 
water in communities thousands of miles away. Monetary decisions 
made by a small group of brokers and financiers living in the United 
States, China, or Japan can stimulate reverberations, both positive and 
                                                                                                                      
27 See Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia 474 (Brian Massumi trans., 1987). 
28 David Held, Democracy and the New International Order, in Cosmopolitan Democracy: 
An Agenda for a New World Order 99–101 (Daniele Archibugi & David Held eds., 
1995). 
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negative, in countries around the globe.29 Although these decisions are 
made by actors working within national boundaries, the effects of their 
decisions are felt globally. The point is that myths and ideas are no 
longer strictly bounded, as they once were, by geographical demarca-
tions. In short, we no longer live lives of geographic separation and we 
must, therefore, construct a new global mythology capable of generat-
ing broad understanding of transnational actors, their actions, and the 
effect on our global community. To more fully address the evolution of 
shared political, economic, and cultural experiences, I now move to a 
discussion of transnational civil society. 
II. Transnational Civil Society 
 Like mythology, articulation of the concept “civil society” is typi-
cally geographically bounded.30 Conceptually nestled between the 
realm of politics and economics, civil society is the location of voluntary 
associations, social movements, and public groupings organized around 
lifeworld issues.31 Once organized, actors coalescing in civil society can 
have a significant influence on institutions in the “‘international, na-
tional, regional, local, and subcultural arenas.’”32 Proposing the idea of 
a transnational civil society—or a “world civil society,” as Gordon Chris-
tenson would have it—requires both a dramatic reconceptualization of 
civil society and a willingness to blur the artificial boundaries of sover-
eignty.33 As with civil society as it is normally conceived, transnational 
civil society involves combinations of actors in voluntary associations. 
But transnational civil society sheds cultural parochialism and excep-
tionalism, and suggests that transnational actors should disregard tradi-
tional state boundaries when necessary to confront matters of transna-
tional public concern. Still, even transnational actors must rely on their 
own national legal systems to protect basic rights.34 To that end, 
“[c]ooperation is expected from all governments and international re-
gimes to ensure these background rights. Neither human dignity nor 
                                                                                                                      
29 See id. at 99. 
30 See Jean L. Cohen & Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory 2 (1992). 
31 See generally Jürgen Habermas, 2 The Theory of Communicative Action: Life-
world and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
Beacon Press 1984) (1981). 
32 Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. Transnat’l L. & 
Pol’y 405, 411 (1997) (quoting Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contri-
butions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy 373 (William Rehg trans., MIT 
Press 1996) (1992)). 
33 See Christenson, supra note 32, at 412 (introducing the concept of “world civil society”). 
34 See id. at 414. 
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voluntary transactions or investments can thrive in world civil society 
without credible and legitimate international and national legal sys-
tems.”35 Thus there is a recursive relationship between national and 
international legal institutions, on the one hand, and on the other, 
transnational actors in civil society invested in the work of advancing 
human rights. 
 In his recent work, Jeffrey Alexander attempts to clarify and re-
claim the long debated and oft-misunderstood concept of civil society 
in order to accentuate its relevance to the promotion and realization 
of justice:36 
Justice depends on solidarity, on the feeling of being con-
nected to others, of being part of something larger than our-
selves, a whole that imposes obligations and allows us to share 
convictions, feelings and cognitions, gives us a chance for 
meaningful participation, and respects our individual person-
alities even while giving us the feeling that we are all in the 
same boat.37 
Through his emphasis on the necessity of acknowledging certain uni-
versalisms while simultaneously valuing local uniqueness, Alexander 
engages his reader in a balancing act that generates justice by defining 
an Archimedean vantage point from which to consider both the uni-
versal and the unique.38 Through the analysis of civil society, Alexander 
seeks to accentuate “the we-ness of a national, regional, or international 
community, the feeling of connectedness to ‘every member’ of that 
community, that transcends particular commitments, narrow loyalties, 
and sectional interests.”39 In this view, Alexander is joined by Kwame 
Anthony Appiah, who recently cited a similar position held by Adam 
Smith, the eighteenth-century philosopher of capitalism.40 Smith, ac-
cording to Appiah, while struggling to understand why human beings 
can be moved to action in the service of strangers, concluded that this 
impulse has little to do with vague notions of benevolence.41 
                                                                                                                      
35 Id. 
36 See generally Alexander, supra note 1. 
37 Id. at 13. 
38 See generally id. 
39 Id. at 43. 
40 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers 
156–57 (2006). 
41 See id. (citing Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 157 (Knud Haa-
konssen ed., Cambridge University Press 2002) (1759)). Smith instead intuited that: “‘It is 
a stronger power, a more forcible motive, which exerts itself upon such occasions. It is 
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 But, as Alexander admits, while the notion of justice is ubiquitous 
in philosophy and social science (and jurisprudence, too, of course), 
it nonetheless remains a terribly difficult concept to define and, per-
haps, an even more difficult one to realize. Alexander argues that 
“[m]odernity is fundamentally multiple and ambiguous.”42 Here, he 
joins the likes of Zygmunt Bauman, who stresses the liquidity of mod-
ern political, economic, and cultural relations.43 What this conveys is 
the perennial confluence of the fixed and the chaotic—or, as Alexan-
der suggests, the transcendent and the particular—as each affects our 
local, regional, national, and international relations. At the local level, 
where cultural capital combines with ever-changing external stimuli, 
people rely on their storehouse of mêtis, “a wide array of practical 
skills and acquired intelligence in responding to a constantly chang-
ing natural and human environment.”44 
 In the context of the synergistic relationship between the “tran-
scendent and the particular,” the concepts of mêtis and techne pro-
vide a useful way to relate the influence of international human rights 
law to the domestic adoption of it. While a body of agreed-upon hu-
man rights principles has emerged, it has done so only through 
wrenching negotiation among United Nations member-states over the 
meaning of concepts like democracy, justice, and equality. In applying 
these principles, the member-states have, alarmingly, misplaced em-
phasis on mêtis. It is techne which “‘came into being when from many 
notions gained from experience’” and represents “a universal judg-
ment about a group of similar things . . . .”45 And although techne is 
defined as a set of universal rules and principles, it is precisely that 
universality which may expose it to numerous local variations.46 Con-
sequently, when the United States—or any other country—adopts in-
ternational human rights standards, these standards are always inter-
preted within the context of a mêtis specific to the United States. 
 The implementation of a global human rights discourse requires 
both mêtis and techne. In place of the artificial distinctions that all 
                                                                                                                      
reason, principle, conscience, the inhabitant of the breast, the man within, the great judge 
and arbiter of our conduct.’” Id. at 157 (quoting Smith, supra, at 157). 
42 Alexander, supra note 1, at 22. 
43 See generally Bauman, supra note 9. 
44 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed 313 (1998). Mêtis is in constant interplay with techne, 
the tightly structured and rule-bounded principles and propositions that characterize uni-
versal order. Id. at 319–20. 
45 Id. at 320 (citation omitted). 
46 See id. 
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cultures make on the basis of such things as race, ethnicity, class, relig-
ion, and national origin, justice requires the global privileging of 
“‘reason, principle,’” and “‘conscience’” through realization of moral-
ity in the application of law.47 This is not to say, however, that the im-
plementation of a human rights discourse should only appeal to rea-
son. In recognition of the thickness of culture, it is necessary for 
advocates of a universal human rights discourse to recognize the role 
of emotion in the effective transnational administration of justice.48 
Catherine Lane West-Newman challenges the conventional Occiden-
tal reduction of human rights to pure reason by exploring the hetero-
geneous transnational manifestations of justice based on complicated 
and culturally bounded expressions of emotion. Specifically, West-
Newman argues for a culturally specific analysis of the ways in which 
“emotions connect with law.”49 The challenge is to effectively adminis-
ter a transnational human rights discourse that privileges cultural 
capital (mêtis) but simultaneously imposes an agreed upon body of 
law necessary to protect human dignity (techne). 
 Theoretical articulations of transnational civil society emphasize a 
universal commitment to a notion of justice that constructs a narrative 
that encourages a political culture “more tolerant of individual differ-
ences and more compatible with the pluralization of interests.”50 The 
idea is to promote a common narrative that enhances one’s under-
standing of transnational norms and cultural codes, thereby enabling a 
fuller understanding of otherness. Readers of my earlier work may 
cringe at my acknowledgment of the existence of universals in any 
shape or form, but it is clear that, while they may be mediated, negoti-
ated, and exhibit local flavor, universal codes of behavior do exist.51 
This is largely because human beings have been interacting in mean-
ingful ways through trade, cohabitation, and cross-cultural communica-
tion for millenia. When people communicate across cultural bounda-
                                                                                                                      
47 Appiah, supra note 40, at 157 (quoting Smith, supra note 42, at 157). 
48 See Catherine Lane West-Newman, Feeling for Justice? Rights, Laws, and Cultural Con-
texts, 30 Law & Soc. Inquiry 305, 330 (2005). 
49 Id. at 306. 
50 Alexander, supra note 1, at 46. 
51 See, e.g., generally Bruce A. Arrigo, Dragan Milovanovic, & Robert Carl 
Schehr, The French Connection in Criminology (2005); Bruce Arrigo, Dragan 
Milovanovic, & Robert Carl Schehr, The French Connection: Implications for Law, Crime and 
Social Justice, 24 Human. and Soc’y, 162 (2000); Robert Carl Schehr, Conventional Risk 
Discourse and the Proliferation of Fear 16 Crim. Just. Pol’y Rev. 38 (2005); Robert Carl 
Schehr, From Restoration to Transformation: Victim-Offender Mediation as Transformative Justice, 
18 Mediation Q. 151 (2001); Robert C. Schehr & Dragan Milovanovic, Conflict Mediation 
and the Postmodern: Chaos, Catastrophe, and Psychoanalytic Semiotics, 26 Soc. Just. 208 (1999). 
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ries they do so by discussing those issues that matter most to them.52 
Thus, while those of us in the United States may not have much interest 
in or knowledge about the ritualistic habits displayed in African tribal 
ceremonies, both U.S. citizens and Africans care deeply about justice, 
fairness, and respect. 
 Unfortunately, claiming residence in a community, region, or 
nation by definition requires making clear in-group and out-group 
distinctions.53 These distinctions are often based on parochial notions 
of exceptionalism, local superiority, and consequent exclusion of the 
other. But is it necessary for members of any nation to marginalize 
and delegitimate the other in order to retain their sense of cultural 
identity? It is not. When people learn to see the other not as an ab-
stract and disembodied signifier, but instead as a real human being 
with shared interests in a quality of life not dissimilar from their own, 
it is possible to generate the meaningful associations that enable us to 
understand and learn from others. 
 I do not claim that all cultural and biological predispositions to 
suspicion of the other will vanish. To make such a claim would require 
the utopian presumption that there can be both universal clarity of un-
derstanding and a shared motivation for understanding that, while 
praiseworthy, is, for political, economic, and cultural reasons, largely 
impossible. There are good reasons—culturally and even biologically 
grounded ones—for remaining suspicious of those with whom we are 
unfamiliar. Suspicion of what is potentially dangerous is a vital element 
of species survival. In his book about the origins of non-normative and 
harmful behavior, naturalist Lyall Watson writes that species have one 
desire—to survive.54 Genes in all species survive by a simple set of 
three commands: “be nasty to outsiders, be nice to insiders[,] and cheat 
where possible.”55 According to Watson, the further we are removed 
from our direct biological descendants, the less involvement we desire 
to have with “the other,” especially in important matters of life and 
death.56 Stated crudely, ‘I’ll risk further propagation of my bloodline 
                                                                                                                      
52 See Appiah, supra note 40, at 96–97. For example, people across the globe share a 
common interest in “music, poetry, dance, marriage, funerals; values resembling courtesy, 
hospitality, sexual modesty, generosity, reciprocity, the resolution of social conflict; con-
cepts such as good and evil and right and wrong, past, present, and future.” Id. 
53 See generally Georg Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (Kurt H. Wolff ed. & 
trans., 1950). 
54 See generally Lyall Watson, Dark Nature: A Natural History of Evil (1997). 
55 Id. at 54, 56, 65. 
56 See id. at 52–53 (calculating the genetic benefits of the chimpanzee’s apparently al-
truistic behavior). 
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only for those who already share my DNA.’ For example, mothers or 
fathers will, without thinking, place themselves in harm’s way to protect 
their children. Children will do the same for each other, and for their 
parents. But as we move further away from shared DNA to the next 
level of association, as between a spouse or a lifelong friend, say, it be-
comes less probable that one would jeopardize his or her own life or 
genetic reproduction without first pausing a moment to consider it. 
Hesitation to extend intimacy to strangers, who may pose danger to 
oneself or one’s family, arises in part from a biological predisposition to 
protect those most like oneself. But, for Watson, relationships are both 
biologically and culturally determined.57 Considering what we know 
about cultural filtering mechanisms used to protect indigenous prac-
tices, there is a strong argument in favor of thoughtful skepticism re-
garding those whom we do not know or understand. 
 Reservations against approaching the transcultural other can be 
explained on both biological and cultural grounds and are perfectly 
consistent, in both the short and long term, with protecting oneself, 
one’s family, and one’s culture. So how can this skepticism be overcome 
so that human beings can reposition themselves in ways that enrich 
their shared humanity? From the perspective of hermeneutics, deep 
understanding of the other means overcoming misunderstanding.58 
 To the extent that we are able to be understood, and our will is 
adopted as the prevailing view, we do not experience the “eddies of 
misunderstanding.”59 On the other hand, when confronted with in-
                                                                                                                      
57 See id. at 257–59 (noting culture’s effect on animal behaviors). 
58 The study of hermeneutics commenced in the eighteenth-century with the work of 
Friedrich Ast (1778–1841). Consequent to the rise of Modernism, Ast’s primary concern 
was about ways to gain deep understanding of art, poetry, literature, and scholarship (ver-
ständnis versus missverständnis, or understanding versus misunderstanding). Later, 
Schleiermacher argued that understanding could only come from knowledge of the uni-
versal human experience; specifically, knowledge of daily living and lived experience. Most 
important, the purpose of hermeneutics was to move us to a place of cross-cultural under-
standing. Other founding voices of hermeneutics include Hans-Georg Gadamer and Mar-
tin Heidegger. See generally Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (David 
E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976) and Martin Heidegger, Being and Time ( John Macquarrie 
& Edward Robinson trans., 1962). For a thoughtful and concise overview of the contribu-
tions to the study of hermeneutics see Zygmunt Bauman, Hermeneutics and Social 
Science (1978). 
59 Bauman, supra note 58, at 17. Consider Schopenhauer’s explication of pain and 
happiness: 
Just as a brook forms no eddy so long as it meets no obstructions, so human 
nature, as well as animal, is such that we do not really notice and perceive all 
that goes on in accordance with our will. If we were to notice it, then the rea-
son for this would inevitably be that it did not go according to our will, but 
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comprehension, we are forced to consider the problem of under-
standing. For Bauman, “[i]ncomprehension is a state which calls for 
an effort to make the uncertain certain, the unpredictable predict-
able, the opaque transparent.”60 To fully understand is to embrace the 
autonomy of the other and, whether enthusiastically or not, to endow 
the subject “with authority in the negotiation which follows.”61 Humil-
ity, as one encounters misunderstanding arising from incomprehen-
sion, is of the utmost importance because it is likely that such misun-
derstanding is due to the partiality of the intellect.62 
 Our warehouse of stored knowledge about the world around us 
provides us with the context necessary to gain understanding and to 
effectively interact with it. But our past is also a limitation, in that we 
are constituted by a limited array of interactions which sometimes can 
function to exaggerate differences and thereby construct obstacles 
(eddies) to our ability of fully knowing the other. Meaning can only 
come from experiencing the world firsthand through meaningful in-
tereactions with the other. But how is that to be accomplished? The 
answer is through dialogue.63 In the context of this essay, the urgency 
of dialogical interactions speaks to the need for juridic actors in the 
United States to engage in dialogical relations as a way to come to a 
                                                                                                                      
must have met with some obstacle. On the other hand, everything that ob-
structs, crosses, or opposes our will, and thus everything unpleasant and pain-
ful, is felt by us immediately at once and very plainly. . . . On this rests the 
negative nature of well-being and happiness, as opposed to the positive na-
ture of pain . . . . 
Id. at 194 (citation omitted). 
60 Id. at 195. 
61 Id. at 203. 
62 See id. at 225. As Bauman explains: 
It is neither the complexity of the universe, nor its notorious amenability to 
contradictory interpretations, which in this case defies the power of intellect. 
It is the partiality of intellect itself, its tendency to see some of the things 
rather than others . . . . Any intellect, however powerful, sets about its work 
loaded with its own past; this past is simultaneously its liability and its asset. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
63 In this context I am speaking of dialogue to mean “a willingness to enter conversa-
tion about ideas, taking a position in openness that can still be altered given additional 
information; a commitment to keep relationships affirming, even as disagreements over 
theory occur; and a willingness to ask value questions about information application.” See 
Ronald C. Arnett, Dialogic Education 10–11 (1992) (summarizing Rob Anderson’s 
explication of presence, unanticipated consequences, otherness, vulnerability, mutual 
implication, temporal flow, and authenticity). In short, dialogical interaction means 
“reaching out to the other in an authentic fashion, willing to try to meet and follow the 
unpredictable consequences of exchange.” Id. at 11. 
2008] Int’l Law and Wrongful Conviction in the United States 145 
more comprehensive understanding of who we are, while enhancing 
our understanding of those from different cultures. Dialogue includes 
thoughtful engagement with both human beings and texts. As it is 
relevant to our interests here, that engagement means sincere interac-
tion with transnational legal practitioners and legislators, as well as 
critical deconstruction and analysis of juridic texts. Probing the mean-
ing of foreign statutes and case law is consistent with Sidorkin’s First 
and Second Discourses.64 The First Discourse signifies the authority of 
the text, a master narrative that establishes common ground upon 
which dialogue can function to generate a common perception of the 
text.65 The Second Discourse provides for “speaking out” about the 
text.66 This is an organic process that opens up the Master Narrative 
for deconstruction and reinterpretation and that will never generate a 
singular truth. Rather, through the process of engaging the text, a 
transmogrified form consistent with local interests, a new interpreta-
tion befitting local needs, will be achieved. For our purposes, a shared 
introduction to transnational jurisprudence gives way to dialogical 
deconstruction of the merits of that jurisprudence. 
 Dialogical intercourse is necessary for human beings to realize 
their humanity. To be truly human is to acknowledge the essence of the 
other. Without that acknowledgement, “I” cannot exist. Said differently, 
“failure to affirm the being of the other brings myself into non-
being.”67 For Martin Buber, “‘all real living is meeting.’”68 When com-
munication breaks down we are prone to view the other with distrust 
and misunderstanding. We overly value our own opinions, and devalue 
those held by our adversaries.69 Polarization of discourse generates 
                                                                                                                      
64 See generally Alexander M. Sidorkin, Beyond Discourse: Education, the Self, 
and Dialogue (1999). 
65 See id. 
66 See id. 
67 Id. at 12. 
68 Id. at 11 (citation omitted). 
69 See Ronald C. Arnett, Communication and Community: Implications of Mar-
tin Bauber’s Dialogue 15 (1986). Consider Martin Buber’s remarks: 
Man is more than ever inclined to see his own principle in its original purity 
and the opposing one in its present deterioration, especially if the forces of 
propaganda confirm his instincts in order to make better use of them. . . . He 
is convinced that his side is in order, the other side fundamentally out of or-
der, that he is concerned with the recognition and realization of the right, his 
opponent with the masking of his selfish interest. Expressed in modern ter-
minology, he believes that he has ideas, his opponent only ideologies. This 
obsession feeds the mistrust that incites the two camps. 
Id. 
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misunderstanding. Alternatively, a discourse that is relationship-cen-
tered moves us closer to dialogical communication, and requires a 
commitment on all sides to empathize with the other to come nearer to 
understanding. One way to accomplish this is to attain a healthy inter-
est in the folkways and mores of those different from us, and to ask 
questions of them. By asking questions in the spirit of a dialogical 
community we come closer to understanding, and we demonstrate a 
sincere commitment to enhanced awareness. In the space that exists 
between questioner and listener, and interpretation of foundational 
texts, emerges the dialogical moment. Through our ability to open up 
to others we begin to know ourselves more fully.70 Through meaning-
fully shared discourse a process of true awakening unfolds for each in-
terlocutor because each plays the role of questioner and listener. This 
dialogical process is what moves us nearer to our shared humanity. 
 A true dialogic community would be a place where “partners must 
cooperate to establish a mutual world in which they may or may not 
agree. What is important is how partners must coordinate to establish 
meaning between themselves.”71 Guilar suggests that Gadamer’s her-
meneutic community is similar to Dewey’s “organic community” —like 
Dewey, who emphasized praxis as the way to true knowledge, Gadamer 
contends that “dialogic conversations about concrete actions and re-
flections upon them [take] place within a context of historic truths also 
open to inquiry.”72 Most important for Gadamer is the idea that inter-
                                                                                                                      
70 The notion that we cannot know ourselves without interaction with the other has a 
long history in philosophy and sociology that gained prominence in the 1930s. See, e.g., 
generally Charles Horton Cooley, Human Nature and Social Order (1922); John 
Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Educa-
tion (1944); Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959); 
George Herbert Mead, The Mind, Self, and Society: From the Standpoint of a So-
cial Behaviorist (Charles W. Morris ed., 1967); W.I. Thomas, W.I. Thomas on Social 
Organization and Social Personality: Selected Papers (Morris Janowitz ed., 1966). 
Dewey’s pragmatism emphasized the importance of interaction with the objective world to 
gain true knowledge. See generally Dewey, supra. For Mead, there can be no self without the 
other to interact with. See generally Mead, supra. Without someone to respond to our public 
self (what Mead referred to as “Me”) we can have no sense of the “I” —whether we are 
smart, funny, sad, supportive, or anything else. Id. In short, we have no feedback with 
which to determine who we are. The primary emphasis for all symbolic interactionists is 
that human beings are perpetually engaged in a process of interaction with the external 
world of objects and people, and that through this interaction—and our processing of and 
reaction to it—we evolve our sense of who we are. 
71 Joshua D. Guilar, Intersubjectivity and Dialogic Instruction, in Radical Pedagogy (2006), 
http://radicalpedagogy.icaap.org/content/issue8_1/guilar.html (citation omitted). 
72 Id. 
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pretation of dialogical moments is open-ended.73 There is no attempt 
to establish truth once and for all.74 
 The most important lesson for us to draw from the body of litera-
ture addressing hermeneutics and dialogue is the potential for transna-
tional understanding. Despite our differences, which will always be pre-
sent, a process exists to allow for real discovery and growth. Through 
our earnest engagement with the other as listeners and questioners, we 
humanize the other in a way that validates them and ourselves. We 
learn from them, and they from us. From a dialectical perspective, dis-
missing the jurisprudential practices and decisions emanating from in-
ternational courts of law only limits our own ability to grow, just as our 
refusal to engage in dialogue with transnational courts limits their abil-
ity to grow. Absent dialogue, we remain enshrouded in polarizing dis-
course. The result is a far too parochial and, thus, stunted jurispru-
dence. 
 As we continue to interact in increasingly transcultural contexts, 
we must generate myths necessary to open ourselves to “the other” in 
meaningful ways.75 In short, what I am calling for are those “human 
sunrises” that Alice Walker recognizes to signify the common thread 
of human striving for justice, equity, value, and joy. We are not disem-
bodied signifiers, but rather human beings with shared interests in a 
certain quality of life. 
 But, the skeptic may ask, if we are open to being influenced in sig-
nificant and thoughtful ways through reasoned consideration of alter-
nate modes of living, and if we then become too cosmopolitan in our 
open engagement with other cultures, does it not become possible that 
we will risk losing aspects of our own culture that we value? Probably 
                                                                                                                      
73 See Fred R. Dallmayr, Dialogue or Disjunction Borders or Horizons?: Gadamer and Haber-
mas Revisited, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 825, 833 (2000). See generally Gadamer, supra note 58. 
74 See generally Gadamer, supra note, 58. 
75 In a recent commencement address delivered to Naropa University, Alice Walker of-
fered a fair summation of the point I am attempting to make here: 
When it is all too much, when the news is so bad mediation itself feels useless, 
and a single life feels too small a stone to offer on the altar of peace, find a 
human sunrise. Find those people who are committed to changing our scary 
reality. Human sunrises are happening all over the earth, at every moment. 
People gathering, people working to change the intolerable, people coming 
in their robes and sandals or in their rags and bare feet, and they are singing, 
or not, and they are chanting, or not. But they are working to bring peace, 
light, compassion to the infinitely frightening downhill slide of human life. 
Alice Walker, Commencement Address at Naropa Univ. (May 12, 2007), in Alan Finder, 
With Iraq War as a Backdrop, Speakers Reflect on the Future, N.Y. Times, June 10, 2007, § 1, at 
34. 
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not. Countless historical examples demonstrate how cultures have been 
able to absorb, embrace, and thrive amidst an influx of transcultural 
influences. To adopt a universal human rights discourse and the pro-
cedures necessary to document abuses would signify a commitment to a 
certain standard of dignity agreed to by people across the planet.76 But 
it would not mean that all international human rights agreements must 
be adopted by each participating state in the same ways. Consider, for 
example, the attempt of Islamic women in Palestine to reinterpret Is-
lam consistent with international human rights campaigns against gen-
der discrimination. According to Sally Engle Merry, who attended the 
conference on women in Gaza, “[Islamic women] did not ask for gen-
der equality nor did they reject Islam.”77 Instead, these women sought 
specific protections that would afford them greater choice and public 
safety.78 They attempted to graft international human rights protections 
upon pre-existing cultural practices. 
 The United States itself is perhaps the paramount example. Con-
sider the numerous and familiar ways in which the United States con-
tinues to thrive with a strong national identity, all the while its people 
and institutions appropriate transnational ideas and products. Ameri-
can culture signifies a confluence of multi-cultural influences that in-
cludes contributions from peoples migrating from all points on the 
globe, not to mention those who were present prior to colonization.79 
The very fact that we are a federation of states makes this point clearly. 
During the months preceding the Constitutional Convention in 1787, 
the framers were beset by disagreements among colonial representa-
tives over ways to preserve jurisdictional uniqueness.80 And despite the 
homogenization of laws across the United States brought about by pas-
sage of the Fourteenth Amendment, one cannot deny the nation’s his-
tory and continued championing of spirited efforts to retain local 
autonomy.81 
                                                                                                                      
76 Sally Engle Merry, Constructing a Global Law—Violence Against Women and the Human 
Rights System, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 941, 943 (2003) (stating that “[t]he process of ratifi-
cation, preparing reports, and presenting and discussing reports fosters new cultural un-
derstandings of gender and violence”). 
77 Id. at 944–45. 
78 Id. at 944. 
79 See generally Charles C. Mann, 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before 
Columbus (2005) (discussing American history before colonization). 
80 See generally Theodore Draper, A Struggle for Power: The American Revolu-
tion (1996); Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights (1999). 
81 The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified in 1868, requires that: “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due proc-
 
2008] Int’l Law and Wrongful Conviction in the United States 149 
 Leonard Levy recounts the extraordinary balancing act main-
tained by James Madison, the author of the Bill of Rights, up to its pas-
sage in 1791.82 Amendments to the U.S. Constitution were necessary to 
maintain the fragile accord between the Federalists and the Anti-
federalists, the latter of which feared the creation of a strong central-
ized government.83 But where did the rights sought to be protected 
from a strong national authority originate? Many of the rights articu-
lated in the Bill of Rights can be traced back to English common law 
and the Magna Carta.84 According to Levy, the “Magna Carta had come 
to mean indictment by grand jury, trial by jury, and a cluster of related 
rights of the criminally accused . . . .”85 Consider as well the importance 
of habeas corpus, a storied writ that appears to predate even the Magna 
Carta.86 The rights of the accused flowing from the Magna Carta and 
the writ of habeas corpus were adopted by the colonists and then rein-
terpreted and expanded to complement the other freedoms articulated 
in the U.S. Bill of Rights.87 Thus, from the founding of the United 
States, its judges and legislators have freely borrowed from the laws and 
procedures of foreign nations—especially England—and have modi-
fied them to suit the perceived needs of a newly democratic state. This 
process is a clear example of fluidity as it is realized through mêtis.88 
 More contemporary examples can be found in the identity move-
ment of the 1980s, which demonstrated that Americans are strident 
protectors of (and effusive participants in) their real or imagined eth-
nic heritage.89 Irish-Americans, German-Americans, Mexican-Americans, 
Chinese-Americans—the list goes on and on—lay claim to a portion of 
the composite identity of American people as a whole. We happily, of-
                                                                                                                      
ess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
82 See Levy, supra note 80, at 32–37. 
83 See id. at 32. 
84 See, e.g., id. at 231 (tracing the Eighth Amendment’s origins to the Magna Carta). 
85 Id. at 2. 
86 See id. at 44. 
87 See Levy, supra note 80, at 65. 
88 Since the framers were themselves English, this is admittedly a bit of a stretch. My 
point is that, from the time of the nation’s founding, judges, legislators, and scholars 
agreed upon a principle of recognizing the law of nations. Moreover, the framers appro-
priated what they viewed as the strengths of common law, but interpreted this “borrowed” 
law to suit culturally specific political, economic, and cultural needs. 
89 The practice of actively participating in the creation of an invented reality—one that 
may reflect shards of a person’s ethnic history, but which is created to serve a family narra-
tive—is referred to by Hobsbawm and Ranger as “mythistory,” or the invention of tradi-
tion. See Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in The Invention of Tradition 
1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983). 
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ten greedily, receive into our own culture foreign art, literature, film, 
music, sports, food, automobiles, motorcycles, and clothing, to name 
just a few popular imports. Our universities flourish with international 
scholars who provide our students and communities a limited but in-
valuable insight into life elsewhere. 
 That said, do we alter our sense of what it means to be American 
by consuming these cultural imports? Or, does this consumption en-
hance our sense of identity by making us better able to discern the 
meaning of these imported influences by way of juxtaposition to our 
American-ness? I suggest that the answer to each question is affirmative. 
By making our cultural filters more porous and permitting the influ-
ences of other cultures to penetrate our consciousness, we cause our-
selves to change, if ever so slightly, in a way that opens us up to new ex-
periences and new ways to appreciate difference. I perceive this to be a 
good thing—a cosmopolitan thing—and a clear manifestation of liquid 
modernity. Similarly, by being open to new ideas and ways of being, the 
definition of American-ness itself changes to include a more cosmopoli-
tan sensibility. It becomes normal for us to accept without a second 
thought that international food, music, literature, cars, ideas, and the 
like are simply a part of the pastiche that constitutes American-ness. It 
is in this way that we in the United States can skate freely on smooth 
space without ever relinquishing our sense of being Americans. 
 Whatever one considers a unique U.S. identity to be, it has—as 
with other strong national identities tied to claimed cultural capital— 
proven to be extraordinarily resilient to dramatic alteration. No matter 
what international influences are consumed by nation-states with a 
strong sense of national identity, people are generally going to prefer 
home-grown versions when they are available.90 The French, for exam-
ple, may enthusiastically embrace American television programming, 
but are more likely to enjoy French programming, when it exists, be-
cause it is their own.91 The point is that people around the globe tend 
to be especially critical consumers of transnational imports. They are 
not, as some would have us believe, empty vessels easily swayed by 
transcultural influences. Instead, as generations of spectator studies 
have confirmed, complex interactions and filtering processes take place 
between consumers and images and ideas.92 Our socialization as part of 
local, regional, and national associations provides context for critical 
                                                                                                                      
90 See Appiah, supra note 40, at 108. 
91 Id. 
92 See, e.g., Carol J. Clover, Men, Women, and Chain Saws (1992); Linda Williams, 
Hard Core: Power, Pleasure, and the “Frenzy of the Visible” (1990). 
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consideration of non-native ideas and behaviors. To presume, as Justice 
Scalia appears to, that there is some entrenched, essentialistic Ameri-
can-ness that serves as a nodal point for determination of jurispruden-
tial decisions belies both U.S. history and a reasoned understanding of 
the perpetual interplay of transcultural artifacts with U.S. political, eco-
nomic, and cultural experiences. 
III. Cosmopolitan Democracy 
 To further contextualize the location and privileging of interna-
tional human rights law as a necessary consideration in domestic 
wrongful conviction jurisprudence, it is important that we understand 
the principles of cosmopolitan democracy and, more specifically, the 
way in which cosmopolitan democracy has emerged over the course of 
the last century to confront more conventional articulations of the 
nation-state centered on theories of democracy. 
 Cosmopolitan democracy refers to the application of democratic 
principles across nation-state boundaries in an effort to impart people 
everywhere with greater participation in and real authority regarding 
the decisions that directly affect their lives. Following Held, “The term 
cosmopolitan is used to indicate a model of political organization which 
citizens, wherever they are located in the world, have a voice, input 
and political representation in international affairs, in parallel with 
and independently of their own governments.”93 
 Historically, the primary author associated with the idea of cosmo-
politan democracy is Immanuel Kant. Kant’s essay, “Perpetual Peace: A 
Philosophical Essay,” originally published in 1795, lays the foundation 
for a “Federation of Free States.”94 His aspiration, in this essay, was to 
further global peace through the avoidance of war.95 According to 
Kant, a perpetual state of war-making could only be averted through 
the adoption of laws respecting republicanism (liberty) across interna-
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tional borders, from which an “federation of nations” would arise.96 
The logic of Kant’s theory speaks to the heart of republicanism: 
namely, that there can be no actual global democracy until all states 
adhere to reasoned participation in foedus pacificum (covenant of 
peace).97 This federation would not be ruled by a centralized world 
government, but would instead operate through the principles of lib-
erty and the application of public laws.98 Once a group of people or-
ganized as a state commits to the rule of a form of law predicated on a 
pure republican commitment to liberty, other nation-states will be in-
spired to attach themselves to that beginning state, thereby creating an 
ever-expanding democratic nexus.99 
 Kant’s notion of a Federalism of Free States is evocative, to me, of a 
Mandelbrot Set. Mandelbrot Sets, named for mathematician Benoit 
Mandelbrot, are generated using fractal geometry.100 An infinite set of 
related quadratic equations defines which numbers belong to a given 
Mandelbrot Set.101 If one solves these iterative equations and plots the 
result each time, the image that begins to emerge has self-similar sub-
components that nonetheless exhibit unique local variations.102 To il-
lustrate this point, a shaded plot depicting part of a Mandelbrot Set is 
reproduced below. The image portrays a center, or nodal point, with an 
endless array of associated or linked approximations of that nodal 
point affixed to it. The possibility of visualizing Kant’s theory of a Fed-
eralism of Free States through the lens of Mandelbrot Sets appears in 
the primacy of the core (which represents, by analogy, the establish-
ment of a republican ethic of liberty) and the endless array of near-
copies (representing sympathetic nation-states), each one created by 
the same fundamental values that make up the core, but with local 
(fractal) variations. 
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Figure 1: Detail of a Mandelbrot Set 
Thus, when one views a Mandelbrot Set from afar, one tends to see 
what appears to be an integrated whole.103 But, upon closer examina-
tion, one begins to notice considerable variation at the periphery.104 
 When nation-states begin to attach themselves to each other 
through their shared commitment to liberty, they establish a de facto 
union premised on the law of nations. It was Kant’s belief that this proc-
ess of fractal reconstitution could, in theory, be never-ending so long as 
the nation-states remained committed to replicating the values of lib-
erty.105 In practice, this meant that any traveler visiting any nation-state 
should expect to be afforded a certain set of “rights” necessary for in-
terpersonal peace. This does not mean that the traveler should neces-
sarily be granted the same rights as citizens of the state. Rather, the 
traveler would have a right to a kind of “hospitality” (which would in-
clude, most fundamentally, the right of “entering into social inter-
course”), the exact parameters of which could be codified in public 
law.106 Over time, application of this public law to non-citizens would 
generate what Kant referred to as a “cosmopolitical constitution.”107 It 
is here, in his “Third Definitive Article,” that Kant appears to have 
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birthed the idea of cosmopolitan democracy.108 Through references to 
the social intercourse of peoples across the globe—from the East Indies 
to the Americas, from China to Japan—Kant comes to the contempo-
rary realization that the globe is far smaller than it once was, and is in 
desperate need of a new system of generating common discourse to 
preserve peaceful relations.109 
 Kant’s vision of a global proliferation of republican states, infused 
with a body of international public law to serve the discursive interests 
of global peace and well-being, constitutes the foundation of contem-
porary cosmopolitan theory and suggests a framework for global im-
plementation of human rights law and procedures.110 Kant’s influence 
can clearly be read in S. James Anaya’s definition of international law: 
“International law is a universe of authoritative norms and proce-
dures—today linked to international institutions—that are in some 
measure controlling across jurisdictional boundaries.”111 For Supreme 
Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, the federalism inspired by Kant 
describes 
the proper relationship between domestic courts and transi-
tional tribunals . . . “the federalism of free nations,” to use a 
phrase of the philosopher Immanuel Kant. Just as our domestic 
laws develop through a free exchange of ideas among state and 
federal courts, so too should international law evolve through a 
dialogue between national courts and transnational tribunals 
and through the interdependent effect of their judgments.112 
 Philosopher John Rawls establishes a similar mechanism for the 
defense of human rights through his articulation of “justice as fairness” 
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and his derivation of the “law of peoples.”113 Rawls’s “law of peoples” 
encompasses all people everywhere and provides the foundation neces-
sary to promote fairness.114 The basic principles constituting the law of 
peoples are justice, the normative “right,” and the common good. 
These principles establish the ideal against which both interstate and 
intrastate activity is to be assessed. The law of peoples differs from in-
ternational law, however, in that the latter is a formal (not theoretical) 
system of positive law, albeit one largely bereft of enforcement mecha-
nisms. 
 As it relates to Kant’s notion of a federalism of free states, Rawls 
makes it clear that the law of peoples, if enacted, would challenge con-
ventional notions of sovereignty because nation-states would become 
compelled to adhere to basic human rights principles.115 Challenging 
conventional notions of state sovereignty is consistent with cosmopoli-
tan democracy, and Rawls emphatically contends that a state does not 
have the “right to do as it likes with people within its own borders.”116 
Conceptually, a law of peoples—a law that protects all people every-
where from intrastate and interstate transgressions—delegitimates con-
ventional thinking about the authority of governments and the distri-
bution of control within nation-state boundaries. According to Rawls, 
“[w]e must reformulate the powers of sovereignty in light of a reason-
able law of peoples and get rid of the right to war and the right to in-
ternal autonomy . . . .”117 To be perfectly clear, Rawls’s interest is mak-
ing certain that all people have “basic rights and liberties and 
opportunities; fundamental freedoms and claims of the general good; 
and measures assuring for all citizens adequate all-purpose means to 
make effective use of their freedoms.”118 
 What I find most compelling in Rawls’s account of a law of peoples 
is his clear condemnation of states that violate the human rights of its 
own people.119 Rawls makes a strong case for adherence to rulings of 
the World Court regarding human rights violations taking place in the 
United States or elsewhere, and provides a strong rationale for the U.S. 
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Supreme Court to consider international human rights law when de-
ciding domestic cases involving clear human rights components. And, 
while Rawls’s enumerated list of human rights largely mirrors those 
protected by the U.S. Constitution and its Amendments, his emphasis is 
on these rights as components of the law of peoples. Like constitutional 
rights, rights arising from the law of peoples establish the limits of sov-
ereign authority. These two kinds of rights are distinct, however, in that 
the former, by their very nature, must apply universally and without 
regard to one’s location or citizenship status. 
 So what should be done when states refuse to acknowledge the law 
of peoples? Rawls refers to such states as non-compliant, “outlaw re-
gimes.”120 There are numerous examples of non-compliant regimes 
that have historically been characterized as evil, and which would in no 
way yield to conscience or international pressure to adopt human 
rights principles.121 But what about countries like the United States, 
England, France, or Spain? These are democratic states that spurn and 
resent any suggestion of being associated with non-compliant or outlaw 
status. But—despite both their aversion to being so designated and 
their rhetorical commitment to the fundamental principles of law and 
human rights—these states signify “outlaw” regimes, in Rawls’s calculus, 
because they have historically engaged in imperial global missions seek-
ing to dominate geopolitical relations. An international institution like 
the United Nations, argues Rawls, is necessary to keep outlaw nations in 
check, and to promote the law of peoples. 
 Echoing Rawls’s emphasis on the power of international law to di-
rect rogue state violators of human rights into patterns of behavior 
more consistent with international opinion are S. James Anaya and 
Sally Engle Merry.122 Anaya’s work focuses on ways international hu-
man rights law can be used to embarrass, marginalize, and otherwise 
shame a non-compliant state into more humane treatment of its peo-
ple.123 Thus, for Anaya, state sovereignty is not absolute.124 In the in-
digenous rights arena, states infamously ignore treaties, statutes, and 
case law designed to protect indigenous people and their resources. 
International law and procedures designed to promote human rights 
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serve as a counterweight to domestic obstacles to recognition of indige-
nous sovereignty claims.125 Once established by international oversight 
bodies, complaint procedures designed to amplify violations of human 
rights serve to shame governments into compliance with international 
norms.126 This is an effective check of state power, argues Anaya, be-
cause states want to avoid being viewed as “violators of human rights in 
the eyes of the world community.”127 It is Anaya’s belief that interna-
tional law, despite once serving as an instrument of colonization, may 
now be seen as an avenue to support the demands of indigenous peo-
ple.128 
 Engle Merry argues, consistent with West-Newman’s concern for 
careful understanding of culturally significant interpretations of justice 
and emotion, that advances in international human rights must “build[] 
on national and local cultural practices and religious beliefs . . . .”129 
Culture must be viewed as liquid, not static, in the sense that it is per-
ennially changing in response to internal and external stimuli. And, 
like Anaya, Engle Merry views the adoption of international human 
rights procedures and the subsequent documentation of rights viola-
tions as vital mechanisms for the expression of desirable behavior.130 
These mechanisms are effective, argues Engle Merry, because they 
exert moral pressure on recalcitrant countries. . . . These pol-
icy statements have the legitimacy of international procedures 
[because] they define problems and frame social issues in the 
language of human rights and freedom from discrimination 
and gender equality, [and] they provide a language of argu-
ment that resonates with the values of a secular global mod-
ernity.131 
So, while there is no enforcement mechanism that can compel “outlaw” 
states to behave in accordance with international human rights stan-
dards, condemnation of a state by the international community, and 
legitimization of standards of conduct through published documents, 
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incline outlaw states toward behaving in accordance with the expecta-
tions of the global community. 
 Finally, written in the spirit of cosmopolitan democracy, and con-
sistent with Rawls’s conceptualization of a law of peoples, Steven Lukes 
characterizes contemporary struggles between nation-states as a politi-
cal, economic, and cultural battle among utilitarians, communitarians, 
proletarians, egalitarians, and libertarians.132 Recognizing the diversity 
existing across the globe with regard to the philosophical and ideologi-
cal underpinnings of nation-states, Lukes argues for agreement over 
human rights as a way to establish an “egalitarian plateau.”133 This egali-
tarian plateau constitutes a short list of human rights protections that 
includes “basic civil and political rights, the rule of law, freedom of ex-
pression and association, equality of opportunity, and the right to some 
basic level of material well-being.”134 It is these rights that will provide 
the foundation for settling transnational disputes, because by adopting 
the discourse of human rights conceived as an egalitarian plateau each 
nation-state will be compelled to filter domestic and international be-
havior through a human rights lens. In short, it is through acknowl-
edgement of cosmopolitan democracy that Lukes proposes establishing 
a master narrative capable of administering transnational justice. 
IV. Can We Cite to International Law? 
 The framers of the U.S. Constitution extended comity to interna-
tional law. In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson em-
phasizes the need to maintain a “decent respect to the Opinions of 
Mankind.”135 Federalist Paper 63 makes specific reference to our need 
to be open to insights gleaned from other nations: 
An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to 
every government. . . . [I]ndependently of the merits of any 
particular . . . measure, it is desirable . . . that it should appear 
to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable pol-
icy . . . [and] in doubtful cases, particularly where the national 
councils may be warped by . . . passion or momentary interest, 
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the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may 
be the best guide that can be followed.136 
The Supremacy Clause makes it clear that every state must abide by 
the terms of treaties entered into by the federal government.137 
 Louis Henkin posits two possible sources of domestic law.138 First, 
he argues that the law of nations became “our law” in 1776, appearing 
as part of English common law.139 Next, he suggests the origins of do-
mestic law and reference to a law of nations was a simple matter of be-
coming a sovereign state.140 Once established, the United States was 
forced into recognition of the law of nations, particularly with regard to 
treaties, and the Supremacy Clause established the requirement that 
these laws be followed by the states.141 Recognition of the new status of 
the United States appeared in the case of Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), 
where Chief Justice Jay argued that “the United States had, by taking a 
place among the nations of the earth, become amenable to the law of 
nations . . . .”142 As far back as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
there was no distinction drawn between international law and domestic 
law. International law, such as it was, was considered binding on all 
people.143 Over time, and with the ascent of Britain as an empire, inter-
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national law became consolidated into English common law and in that 
manner was adopted by the American colonies.144 Until 1789, then, 
most “state” or colonial law was international law.145 Thus, while there is 
no expressly stated requirement of domestic adherence to the law of 
nations in either the Constitution or Bill of Rights, international law was 
nonetheless established through the auspices of the common law. 
 But it may be that the most significant influence on U.S. courts 
with regard to the law of nations are the longstanding internationally 
agreed-upon principles of jus cogens (“compelling law”) and jus gen-
tium (“law of nations”).146 Both jus cogens and jus gentium provide for 
the acknowledgement of a mandatory corpus of international law.147 
Customary international law refers to another conception of the law 
of nations, this time as a body of law generated from the international 
community of states and based on past practices.148 Selected “customs 
are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; 
practices that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and economic 
system that they are treated as if they were laws.”149 While not a treaty, 
and thus not binding via the Supremacy Clause, customary interna-
tional law can be used by the courts as a reservoir of legal opinion 
grounded in the community of nations. T. Alexander Aleinikoff sup-
ports his proposal for a tertium quid founded on customary interna-
tional law by pointing to the Supreme Court’s reference to the law of 
nations in The Paquete Habana case.150 There, the Court states that 
“[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as 
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
their determination.”151 Aleinikoff contends that because domestic 
law was based on common law, and therefore indirectly on conven-
tional transnational norms, the states were intended to be bound by 
certain well-established principles reflected in international law.152 
Here, Aleinifoff is joined by Harold Koh, who argues that in the realm 
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of cross-cultural public law litigation, litigants often blend domestic 
and international law to create a tertium quid based on “transnational 
law.”153 Litigants invoking transnational law often argue that some 
transnational norm has been violated. This is a useful strategy, even 
when there can be no internationally enforced judgment against a 
defendant, because rulings in favor of litigants in transnational cases 
provide powerful political leverage for application in other arenas. 
 The Supreme Court has found guiding principles in the “law of 
nations” even when deciding conflicts that have emerged in wholly 
domestic contexts. Court references to international law were often 
driven by the emphasis on “evolving standards of decency” in Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence. In Trop v. Dulles (1958), the Court con-
sidered whether the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by reference to interna-
tional norms of “’dignity, civilized standards, humanity and de-
cency.’”154 Similarly, in Enmund v. Florida (1982), the Court cited the 
abolition of the felony-murder rule in England and India, its restric-
tion in Canada, and its absence from continental Europe.155 Justice 
Blackmun argued that “international law can and should inform the 
interpretation of various clauses of the Constitution, notably the Due 
Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment.”156 
 Numerous decisions emerging from the Supreme Court early in 
the nineteenth century make this point. In Marbury v. Madison (1803), 
Chief Justice John Marshall established the Supreme Court as the ul-
timate authority where interpretation of federal law is concerned.157 
Significantly, however, Justice Marshall never suggested that the judi-
ciary should consider only domestic law.158 The Supreme Court rul-
ings in a number of cases while not always reaching the correct result, 
demonstrated the Court’s avowed commitment to comity with inter-
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national law.159 In Murray v. The Charming Betsy, Chief Justice Marshall 
wrote that “an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate 
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”160 
Charming Betsy thus famously establishes the presumption “that courts, 
in interpreting statutes, should assume that Congress sought to adopt 
legislation consistent with international law.”161 In Schooner Exchange v. 
McFaddon, the Court declined to accept jurisdiction over a ship be-
longing to the nation of France, notwithstanding that it was docked in 
U.S. territory.162 In Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, the Court stated 
that “[t]he decisions of the courts of every country, so far as they are 
founded upon a law common to every country, will be received, not as 
authority, but with respect.”163 The Court consulted international law 
in Worcester v. Georgia to discern the limits of Indian tribal authority.164 
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, where the Court invalidated a Pennsylvania 
statute making it a crime for a master to apprehend one of his slaves 
within that State, the Court acknowledged that, while international 
law itself would not compel return of fugitive slaves against the policy 
of a sovereign state, the Constitution had abrogated that particular 
tenet of the law of nations as to the states.165 Both sides of the Court 
in the infamous Dred Scott case cited international law when deciding 
the question of whether blacks were to be considered “citizens” of the 
United States.166 Finally, in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, the Court in-
voked international law in support of its conclusion that a nation may 
attach conditions to the admission of foreigners into its territories.167 
In each of these cases, the Supreme Court pointed to trends in inter-
national law to support its ruling.168 
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V. Wrongful Conviction in the United States 
 On April 23, 2007, Jerry Miller became the two-hundredth DNA 
exoneree in the United States.169 Miller spent twenty-five years in an 
Illinois prison after being convicted of a crime he did not commit.170 
And while, for innocence activists at least, each exoneration in the 
United States generates a momentary pause of satisfaction, the magni-
tude of the problem of wrongful conviction dominates our professional 
thoughts and actions. There is no way to know how many wrongfully 
convicted people there are in the United States, but we do know that 
the more we scratch, the more we find. But why? 
 In many respects, the United States has taken the lead with re-
gard to scholarship examining the primary causes of wrongful convic-
tions. This is perhaps due to the fact that, among Occidental nations, 
the United States has the largest prison population and is, therefore, 
more likely to generate errors leading to unsound verdicts.171 Cer-
tainly there can be little doubt that the increased frequency of crimes 
for which convicted felons face prison time or the death penalty has 
caused an increase in the number of wrongful convictions.172 Wrong-
ful convictions have far more to do, however, with the way crimes are 
investigated and processed through the criminal justice system. 
 Largely through post mortem review in cases where exonerations 
have been confirmed through DNA testing, legal and social science 
scholars have identified six leading causes of wrongful conviction: (1) 
police and prosecutorial misconduct; (2) false eyewitness identification; 
(3) false confessions; (4) junk science; (5) jailhouse informants; and 
(6) indigent defense. To that list can be added a host of additional 
                                                                                                                      
169 Darryl Fears, Exonerations Change How Justice System Builds a Prosecution, Wash. Post, 
May 3, 2007, at A3. 
170 Id. 
171 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Prison Statistics (Sept. 27, 
2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/prisons.htm. According to the U.S. Bureau of Jus-
tice’s Prison Statistics Summary, by June of 2005 there were 2,186,230 individuals held in 
federal and state prisons and jails, or 488 prison inmates per 100,000 population. This 
presented an increase of 2.6% from 2004. Id. 
172 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 extended the death 
penalty to cover about sixty offenses. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591–3598 (2004 & 2007 Supp.). Ac-
cording to Liebman et al., one of the reasons stated for the significant number of reversi-
ble errors found in capital cases across the United States was the frequency with which 
capital convictions were sought. James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System: Error Rates 
in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, at 51 (2000), available at http://www.thejusticeproject.org/ 
press/reports/pdfs/Error-Rates-in-Capital-Cases-1973-1995.pdf. Simple probability analysis 
would indicate that, by increasing the frequency of capital sentences, society also increases 
the likelihood of there being additional erroneous executions. 
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structural- and process-related causes.173 These include: (1) police in-
terrogation tactics (not necessarily misconduct, but police training in 
Reid School tactics designed to generate confessions); (2) plea bargain-
ing; (3) pretrial discovery; (4) jury perceptions of defendant guilt 
based on the fact that they are defendants in a trial; (5) the Direct 
Connection Doctrine (making it difficult for defendants to introduce 
evidence of a third party suspect); (6) admissibility of eyewitness identi-
fication; (7) factual guilt determinations on appeal; (8) “harmless” er-
ror; and (9) the expansive application of the felony murder rule.174 In 
short, we now have considerable evidence to support arguments that 
the causes of wrongful convictions appear at specific points during 
crime scene investigation and the legal processes that follow. 
 In response to a growing body of scholarship addressing the causes 
and potential remedies for wrongful conviction, legal and social science 
scholars have put forth an impressive set of recommendations to mini-
mize the likelihood of errors occurring during case investigations, at 
trial, and on appeal. Federal recognition of the need to improve each 
aspect of case processing occurred with passage of the Justice For All Act 
in 2004.175 In addition, many states have enacted measures to either 
review case processing standards or institute changes in case process-
ing.176 Still, the actual implementation of proposed changes has been 
slow in coming. The reasons for reluctance to implement changes to 
both structure and process include lack of political will; entrenched 
practices in institutional cultures; self-interested career preservation; 
racial, ethnic, and class prejudice; ignorance; and flagrant disregard of 
the ethical commitments sworn officers and those who work under 
them have to the presumption of innocence and the preservation of 
constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. 
 If innocence scholars and activists adopt a counter-hegemonic 
narrative based on international human rights, and incorporate the 
best practices culled from transnational experience, external pressure 
may be brought to bear on those criminal justice institutions in dire 
need of reform. Juxtaposition with the transnational experience, that is 
to say, may serve to shame and humiliate those who have been derelict 
                                                                                                                      
173 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291, 353. 
174 See generally Rudolph J. Gerber, On Dispensing Injustice, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 135 (2001). 
175 Justice For All Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603–10603e; 14163–14163e (2004 & 2007 
Supp.). 
176 See generally Jon B. Gould, After Further Review: A New Wave of Innocence Commissions, 
88 Judicature 126 (2004). 
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in their responsibilities to ensure safe convictions, and may thereby 
generate a far more critical analysis of U.S. institutions and procedures. 
Conclusion 
 In this essay I have endeavored to establish the theoretical founda-
tion for U.S. adoption of international human rights standards and 
transnational insights pertaining to criminal law and criminal proce-
dure. I have argued that a new global mythology based on human 
rights and capable of explaining the increasingly complex interrelat-
edness of human beings across the planet is necessary to promote hu-
man dignity. I have also argued that this process can only be under-
stood by carefully acknowledging the perennial interplay of mêtis and 
techne within global civil society, and by adopting a theoretical com-
mitment to cosmopolitan democracy. By doing so, we become posi-
tioned to realize Kant’s Federation of Free Nations. 
 I have argued throughout that the obstacles to eradication of the 
primary causes of wrongful conviction are entrenched in professional 
subcultures, and procedural bars established by case law and statute. I 
also argued that, in order for innocence activists to shed their Sisyphian 
load, we must generate a counter-hegemonic narrative based on in-
sights drawn from international law. 
 The practical result of this research is its application to domestic 
jurisprudence regarding the prevention and remedying of wrongful 
convictions. Such a project includes a detailed analysis of transnational 
criminal procedure. In this way, I am able to provide both the theoreti-
cal and empirical impetus for meaningful alteration of our domestic 
jurisprudence, each in the Kantian and Rawlsian spirit of a law of peo-
ples. 
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